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10 Factors Contributing to Waste of Money on Bureaucracy: Pointing to Failed Civil Service Reform: Imposing a Moratorium Not EnoughPenyebab Boros-nya Ongkos Birokrasi: Indikasi Kegagalan Reformasi Birokrasi, Tidak Cukup Hanya Moratorium 10 Penyebab Boros-nya Ongkos Birokrasi: Indikasi Kegagalan Reformasi Birokrasi, Tidak Cukup Hanya Moratorium

10 Factors Contributing to Waste of Money on Bureaucracy: Pointing to Failed Civil Service Reform: Imposing a Moratorium Not Enough

The Minister of Finance recently admitted that spending on the civil service was becoming an increasing burden on budgets.  This is an undeniable fact. In 2011 spending on the central government bureaucracy blew out to Rp 126.5 trillion or 233% more than in 2005. But that level of expenditure did not lead to tangible improvement in services provided by bureaucrats. Sub-national governments in regions have followed the same pattern. Indeed, FITRA has found that 124 sub-national governments spend over 60% of their budgets on civil service costs; and in 16 regions the percentage is over 70%. If this situation is allowed to persist, the Constitutional mandate that Indonesia’s budgets be spent as much as possible to maximize public welfare could be breached.

In FITRA’s view, the following 10 factors are contributing to inflated civil service costs:

  1. The payment of additional remuneration:  These payments are part of bureaucratic reform and are based on the belief that low salaries lead both to corruption and low levels of performance within bureaucracies.  Starting in 2007 the Ministry of Finance trialed such payments by paying its top level officials additional remuneration of up to Rp 46.9 million per month.  The payments were then extended to other ministries including the National Police and the Supreme Court.  By the time the 2010 State budget appeared Rp 13.4 trillion was being budgeted for such payments.  But expenditure of that amount of money has not reined in corruption, as was evidenced by the cases of Gayus and Justice Imas.
  2. Civil service salary increases:  For five years in a row now government has increased salaries within the civil service, the Armed Forces and the National Police.  Increases have ranged from between 5% and 15% (in 2011).  The higher payments included increases in functional and structural allowances, payment of a 13th month end-of-year bonus, payment of meal allowances since 2007, adjustment of the basic pension and payment of 13th month bonuses to retirees.
  3. The Presidential Palace has contributed to an oversized bureaucracy: Unwittingly or not, the Palace has not been an agent of change in reform of the bureaucracy.  Following his re-election for a second term, the President installed a 34-member cabinet to accommodate the interests of his ruling coalition.   That was the upper limit set for the size of a cabinet in Law No. 39/2008 concerning ministries and agencies.  But the President was not content with that: he added 10 deputy ministers to the number.  And from that day to this the division of labor between those deputy ministers on one hand and ministers and top level officials on the other has not been clarified.
  4. A flood of committees:  It is precisely the institution of the presidency which is proving unable to set an example of bureaucratic reform for other ministries and agencies.  Indeed the structure of the Presidential office is becoming more and more over laden.  New layers of bureaucracy are forever being added: special staff, personal staff, spokespersons, work units, the Presidential Advisory Council, a “legal mafia” task force and most recently an overseas workers task force. And it is an irony that the effectiveness of not one of these units has been evaluated, despite the additional burden they place on the State budget. FITRA has noted that at least 9 agencies, committees, task forces and teams now exist within the Presidential Palace (see attachment).
  5. Civil service policies do not take account of cost implications:  As the keeper of the public purse, the Ministry of Finance should be able to predict the budgetary impact of every civil service policy.  Such predictions are particularly easy in the case of fixed costs. But the Ministry should also be able to predict the budgetary impact of sectoral polices involving civil service costs.  Examples of such policies are: making village secretaries permanent civil servants; the certification of teachers; and the appointment of temporary officials on an honorarium basis.
  6. Allowances for regional civil servants:  Government regulation PP No. 58/2005 on management of regional finances empowered sub-national governments to pay additional allowances to their civil servants.  This regulation enabled the government of the Special District of Jakarta, for example, to pay its top bureaucrats an additional Rp 50 million per month and its other staff extra amounts ranging from Rp 2.9 to Rp 4.7 million per month.  Differing levels of salary between regions have seen not just an increase in civil service costs but have also led unevenness across regional civil services as a result of people chasing higher salaries. As a result, regions paying higher civil service salaries will have ever higher civil service costs.  Lack of clarity on upper salary limits is also contributing to a blow out in sub-national civil service costs.
  7. Regional Fiscal Transfers Framework:  The framework for transferring funds from the center to regions is not yet set up in a way that brings greatest benefit to regions.  Since the introduction of regional autonomy 70% of government functions have been decentralized to regions, with the central government retaining control over five key functions.  But the reverse of those proportions applies on the fiscal side of the ledger: since 2005 regions have only been receiving around 31% of total State budget funds. The blow out in public service costs has also been attributable to the funding formula of the General Allocation Fund (known as DAU).  As currently structured the DAU does not encourage regions to perform well, because it is based on a “basic funding allocation” (to cover civil service costs) plus the difference between local fiscal need and local fiscal capacity.  Under this formula sub-national governments that achieve efficiencies in public service spending and/or increase their local fiscal capacity will automatically have their DAU allocations reduced.  Such a situation makes regions lazy about streamlining their bureaucracies and increasing their own source revenue.
  8. Politicization of bureaucracies:  Politicized bureaucracies and civil service recruitment processes in regions are still commonly laden with corruption, collusion and nepotism. Although the central government maintains overall control over recruitment and training of civil servants, it cannot be denied that recruitment processes have a corrupt feel about them.  Political forces are also at work, especially in pre-election periods when heads of local government augment civil service ranks to widen their support base.  Also, after elections, supporters of elected heads of government are often rewarded by being appointed as local civil servants without due process being followed.
  9. Local bureaucracies do not correlate with local conditions:  Thus far the central government has not set ratios between the number of civil servants required to provide a given level of public services.  The lack of such ratios leads to unrelenting recruitment of civil servants with no attention being paid to need.
  10. Formation of new autonomous regions:  The formation of new autonomous regions out of existing regions also stimulates higher levels of expenditure on local civil services.  When a new autonomous region is formed, a new bureaucracy is a must and recruitment processes favor locals rather than professionals.  A side-effect of this process is that DAU allocations fall.  For example, the number of autonomous sub-national governments rose from 477 in 2008 to 481 in 2009.  As a result the average DAU allocation per region fell from Rp 358 billion in 2008 to Rp 351.7 billion in 2009.

Because of all these factors the central government intends to impose a moratorium on public service recruitment.  Seknas FITRA supports such a moratorium, but stresses that of itself it will not be sufficient. The real problem is not just the number of public servants. FITRA’s research has established that total civil service numbers have grown by 2% over the past 5 years, but civil service costs have risen much more sharply, by 20%.  Thus civil service costs, not just numbers, are the nub of the problem.

The mere imposition of a moratorium will not significantly reduce the burden the civil service places on the public purse.  From the point of view of civil service reform, a recruitment freeze must be regarded as a first step in addressing a number of factors contributing to inflated civil service costs.  Other steps that need to be taken include:

  1. Reviewing the appropriateness of additional remuneration.  Unless civil service remuneration systems also include penalties, they will not lift the performance of the civil service or reduce levels of corruption.  Revelations surrounding the cases of Gayus and Justice Imas have shown that additional remuneration within the Ministry of Finance and the Supreme Court was unable to stem the tide of bureaucratic corruption;
  2. Using the “reverse burden of proof” principle in the case of civil servants who possess inappropriate levels of wealth;
  3. Calculating ratios for civil servants on the basis of variables like total population, geographic characteristics, fiscal capacity and functions;
  4. Reform of the regional fiscal transfers system in such a way that it offers incentives to  regions that achieve bureaucratic efficiencies, and discourages the formation of new autonomous regions;
  5. Regulating the payment of allowances for regional officials and permanent civil servants.
  6. Streamlining and placing limits on the formation of ad hoc arrangements (teams, task forces, committees, boards, councils, commissions) and other off-line public institutions.

Yuna Farhan


Seknas FITRA


24 July 2011

Tel +62 (0) 8161860874

Table: Committees, Task Forces/Teams/Boards within State Secretariat of President and Vice President



Budget      (Rp billions)


National Law Commission (State Secretariat)



Presidential Advisory Council



National Team for Reduction of Poverty (Vice Pres)



Task Force on Bureaucratic Reform (Vice Pres)



Presidential Work Unit on Oversight and Control of Development



Task Force for Eradication of Legal Mafia



Team for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries



Center-Regions Synergy Team



Defense Regulations Streamlining Team


No. Civil Servants                                Civil Service Spending                    Capital Spending

Civil Service Spending, Capital Spending & Total Civil Servants


Note:  In the above chart LKPP = central government annual financial report; APBN = State budget as approved by the House of Representatives (DPR); and APBN-P = mid-year amended State budget as approved by the DPR. 

Baru-baru ini Menteri Keuangan menyatakan belanja pegawai semakin membebani anggaran. Fakta ini tidak dapat dipungkiri. Belanja pegawai pada APBN 2011 membengkak hingga 233% atau Rp. 126,5 trilyun dibandingkan tahun 2005. Namun, peningkatan belanja ini tidak dirasakan dampaknya terhadap perbaikan layanan birokrasi kita. Potret yang sama terjadi di daerah. FITRA menemukan 124 daerah yang belanja pegawainya di atas 60% dan 16 daerah diantaranya bahkan di atas 70%. Jika kondisi ini dibiarkan terjadi, maka tujuan anggaran sebesar-besarnya untuk kemakmuran rakyat, sebagaimana diamanatkan pasa 23 konstitusi berpotensi untuk dilanggar.

FITRA mencatat, membengkaknya ongkos birokrasi disebabkan oleh 10 hal berikut:

  1. Pemberian Remunerasi. Pemberian remunerasi sebagai bagian reformasi birokrasi, karena dianggap rendahnya gaji merupakan penyebab birokrasi yang korup dan kinerja rendah. Mulai tahun 2007, Kemkeu mempelopori pemberian remunerasi pejabat dengan grade I di Kemkeu memperoleh remunerasi hinga, Rp.46,9 juta. Remunerasi terus diberlakukan ke Kementerian lain termasuk Polri dan Mahkamah Agung. Bahkan pada APBN-P 2010 dianggarkan Rp. 13,4 trilyun untuk remunerasi. Besarnya ongkos remunerasi yang dikeluarkan mengekang birokrasi korup. Kasus Gayus, dan Hakim Imas mengkonfirmasi hal ini.
  2. Kenaikan Gaji Pegawai. Dalam lima tahun terakhir berturut-turut Pemerintah meningkatkan gaji PNS, TNI/Polri antara 5% sampai 15%, terakhir 2011. Kenaikan tunjangan struktural dan fungsional, pemberian gaji ke 13, pemberian uang makan mulai tahun 2007, penyesuaian pokok pensiun dan pemberian bulan ke 13 untuk pensiun.
  3. Istana Menggemukan Birokrasi. Disadari atau tidak, lingkaran istana tidak menjadi lokomotif reformasi birokrasi. Sejak presiden terpilih kedua kalinya, membentuk kabinet yang mengakomodasi seluruh anggota koalisinya dengan jumlah 34, meskipun Kementerian ini merupakan batas maksimal yang diberikan UU No. 39 tahun 2008 tentang Kementerian/Lembaga. Tidak cukup sampai di sana, Presiden-pun menambah 10 jabatan Wakil Menteri yang sampai saat ini belum jelas pembagian kerjanya dengan Menteri maupun Pejabat Esselon I.
  4. Banjir Komisi. Lembaga Kepresidenan justru tidak mampu memberikan contoh bagi Kementerian/ Lembaga lain. Lembaga Kepresidenan semakin gemuk dengan struktur. Maka dibentuk lagi, lembaga di lingkungan Istana Presiden seperti, staff khusus, staff pribadi, juru bicara, unit kerja, dewan pertimbangan Presiden, satgas mafia hukum dan terakhir Satgas TKI (tenaga Kerja Indonesia). Ironinya, pembentukan lembaga-lembaga ini tidak pernah dievaluasi efektifitasnya, bahkan cenderung menambah beban anggaran Negara. Dari catatan FITRA, setidaknya terdapat 9 badan, komisi, satuan ataupun Tim yang berada di lingkungan istana (lihat lampiran).
  5. Kebijakan Pegawai tanpa Mempertimbangkan Anggaran. Sebagai bendahara Negara seharusnya Menkeu mampu memprediksi setiap kebijakan berkaitan dengan pegawai akan berdampak pada belanja pegawai “budget constraint”. Terlebih belanja ini bersifat fix cost yang mudah diprediksi. Kemkeu seharusnya sudah memprediksi, kebijakan sektoral yang berimplikasi pada beban belanja pegawai seharusnya sudah dapat dilihat bebannya terhadap anggaran, seperti kebijakan pengangkatan Sekdes menjadi PNS dan sertifikasi Guru, serta pengangkatan pegawai honorer.
  6. Tunjangan Pegawai Daerah. PP No 58 tahun 2005 tentang Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah memperbolehkan daerah memberikan tambahan tunjangan pada pegawai daerah. Di DKI Jakarta, pejabat eselon I mendapatkan tambahan penghasilan sampai dengan Rp. 50 Juta, dan staff mendapat tambahan antara Rp. 4,7 – 2,9 juta. Perbedaan tambahan tunjangan ini menjadi penyebab beratnya belanja pegawai dan distribusi pegawai yang tidak merata, untuk mengejar tambahan penghasilan, sehingga pada daerah-daerah dengan tambahan penghasilan akan semakin berat beban belanja pegawainya. Ketidak jelasan batasan pemberian tunjangan daerah menyebabkan belanja pegawai membengkak.
  7. Skema Dana Perimbangan. Skema dana perimbangan saat ini belum berpihak pada daerah. Sejak otonomi daerah sebanyak 70% urusan didesentralisasikan ke Daerah, sementara pusat memegang lima kewenangan utama. Namun berbanding terbalik dari sisi fiscal, sejak tahun 2005 rata-rata belanja transfer daerah 31% dari APBN. Membengkaknya belanja pegawai, juga disebabkan oleh formula DAU yang tidak memberikan insentif daerah. Formula DAU saat ini memperhitungkan kebutuhan belanja pegawai sebagai alokasi dana dasar dan selisih antara kebutuhan dengan kapasitas fiscal suatu daerah. Dengan formula ini daerah yang mampu melakukan efisiensi belanja pegawai dan meningkatkan kapasitas fiskalnya, otomatis akan berkurang jatah DAU-nya. Ini membuat daerah malas melakukan perampingan birokrasi dan meningkatkan PAD-nya.
  8. Politisasi Birokrasi. Sistem rekrutment yang sarat KKN terhadap PNSD dan politisasi birokrasi masih terjadi di daerah. Meski pusat memiliki control untuk menilai formasi pegawai yang dibutuhkan dan rekrutment, namun tidak dapat dibantah aroma suap masih tercium saat rekurtmen. Rekrutmen juga tidak terlepas dari politisasi, menjelang Pilkada, Kepala Daerah sebagai Pembina PNSD akan merekrut lebih banyak PNSD untuk meraih dukungan. Juga paska Pilkada, sebagai imbal jasa tim sukses Kepala Daerah menjadi PNSD tanpa melalui mekanisme juga terjadi.
  9. Tidak Ada Rasio Pegawai Berdasarkan Karakteristik Daerah. Sampai saat ini pemerintah belum memiliki rasio jumlah pegawai yang ideal untuk melakukan pelayanan publik. Ketiadaan rasio ini menjadi penyebab terus menerus dilakukan rekurtment pegawai tanpa memperhatikan kebutuhan.
  10. Pemekaran Daerah. Pemekaran daerah juga menjadi pemicu membengkaknya belanja pegawai di daerah. Sebagai konsekuensi daerah baru, kebutuhan akan pegawai merupakan keharusan, ditambah rekrutmen yang masih mengutamakan putra daerah dibandingkan profesionalitas. DAU yang menjadi tumpuan membiayaai pegawai daerah, secara tidak langsung berkurang. Sebagai contoh, pada tahun 2008 terdapat 481 daerah dan tahun 2009 naik menjadi 477 daerah, karena terjadinya pemekaran, rata-rata penerimaan DAU berkurang, dari 358 milyar pada tahun 2008 menjadi 351,7 miliar pada tahun 2009.

Dari 10 Penyebab membengkaknya belanja birokrasi, Pemerintah bermaksud melakukan moratorium rekrutmen PNS. Seknas FITRA mendukung langkah tersebut, namun yang perlu diingat Moratorium PNS saja tidaklah cukup. Persoalan sebenarnya tidak hanya pada jumlah pegawai yang terus meningkat. Dari hasil kajian FITRA, rata-rata kenaikan jumlah pegawai dalam 5 tahun terakhir adalah 2 persen, sementara kenaikan belanja pegawai jauh lebih signifikan yakni 20%. Artinya, beratnya belanja pegawai lebih disebabkan semakin meningkatnya ongkos pegawai dibandingkan jumlah Pegawai.

Pemberlakuan moratorium saja tidak akan siginifikan mengurangi beban Negara. Oleh karenanya, Moratorium sebagai bagian kerangka reformasi birokrasi harus dipandang sebagai pintu masuk untuk melakukan berbagai pembenahan berbagai sistem kepegawaian yang menjadi penyebab membengkaknya belanja pegawai, yakni:

  1. Mengkaji ulang pemberlakuan remunerasi. Pemberian remunerasi tanpa disertai punishment tidak akan efektif meningkatkan kinerja birorkasi dan mengurangi korupsi. Terbuknya kasus Gayus dan hakim Imas, menunjukan remunerasi di Kemenkeu dan MA tidak mampu menaha laju korupsi di birokrasi.
  2. Pembuktian terbalik terhadap Pegawai yang memiliki harta tidak wajar.
  3. Penyusunan rasio jumlah pegawai berdasarkan variable jumlah penduduk, kondisi geografis, kemampuan keuangan dan fungsi.
  4. Reformulasi skema dana perimbangan yang memberikan insentif bagi daerah yang melakukan efisiensi jumlah pegawai dan disisentif bagi terjadinya pemekaran daerah baru.
  5. Pengaturan pemberian tunjangan pejabat dan PNS daerah.
  6. Pembenahan dan Pembatasan pembentukan lembaga-lembaga ad hoc (Tim, Satgas, Komite, Badan, Dewan, Komisi) dan Lembaga Non-Struktural lainnya.

Jakarta, 24 Juli 2011

Yuna Farhan


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